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SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE EARLY NATIONAL
PERIOD
MAEVA MARCUS*
Professor Casper did not consider what role the judiciary played
in working out the separation of powers guidelines found in the
Constitution. No discussion of separation of powers in the early
Republic would be complete, however, without reference to the ju-
diciary. Because that has been the focus of my work for many
years, I expect that I was invited to participate in this symposium
to fill in the blanks, so to speak. I would therefore like to describe
the judiciary's contributions to the evolution of the separation of
powers doctrine during the initial years of the establishment of the
American government under the Constitution. In so short an essay
I can provide only the barest outline of the incidents that have led
me to the thesis I propound, but at least I can convey some idea of
its basis in fact.'
Before I begin, I would like to indicate my complete agreement
with the manner in which Professor Casper approached the prob-
lem of understanding the development of separation of powers
doctrine. With a knowledge of the general ideas prevailing among
the founding generation, he examined a number of "practical
problems of governmental organization and the conduct of govern-
ment ' 12 and concluded that the primary concern of the participants
in the new government was not to adhere blindly to separation of
powers notions, but rather to find "'an effectual mode of adminis-
* Director of Documentary History Project, Supreme Court of the United States.
1. For a longer, more detailed version of this thesis and its proofs, see Marcus & Van
Tassel, Judges and Legislators in the New Federal System, 1789-1800, in JUDGES AND LEG-
ISLATORS: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY 1 (R. Katzmann ed. 1988). The documents on
which that essay and this Comment are based were gathered by James M. Buchanan, Chris-
tine Jordan, Maeva Marcus, James R. Perry, and Stephen Tull, members of the staff of the
Documentary History Project at the Supreme Court of the United States. Many of the doc-
uments will be published in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1789-1800 (1988) and 3 id. (forthcoming 1989-90).
2. Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and Practices, 30
WMi. & MARY L. REV. 211 (1989).
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tering' the powers of the federal government."'3 I, too, came to that
conclusion as I studied the actions of the first members of the judi-
cial branch and realized that these actions basically were ad hoc.
They were not rooted in preconceived ideas about the role of the
judiciary vis-a-vis the executive and legislative branches, but were
reactions to circumstances that arose during the early years of the
nation's existence.
Chief Justice John Jay, in the first charge that he gave to the
grand jury of the Circuit Court for the District of New York on
April 12, 1790, indicated what everyone's approach should be:
"[W]ise and virtuous men," he declared,
have thought and reasoned very differently respecting Govern-
ment, but in this they have at Length very unanimously agreed
vizt. that its Powers should be divided into three, distinct, inde-
pendent Departments-the Executive, legislative and judicial.
But how to constitute and ballance them in such a Manner as
best to guard against Abuse and Fluctuation, & preserve the
constitution from Encroachments, are Points on which there
continues to be a great Diversity of opinions, and on which we
have all as yet much to learn.4
Jay pointed out that the Constitution had established three sepa-
rate branches and had taken care to provide checks "one on the
other," 5 in order to "keep each within its proper Limits,"' but it
would rest with the men who wielded these governmental powers
to carry them out satisfactorily. The Chief Justice urged:
If then so much depends on our rightly improving the before
mentioned opportunities-if the most discerning and enlight-
ened Minds may be mistaken relative to Theories unconfirmed
by Practice-if on such difficult Questions men may differ in
opinion and yet be Patriots-and if the merits of our opinions
can only be ascertained by Experience, let us patiently abide the
Tryal, and unite our Endeavors to render it a fair and an impar-
tial one.7
3. Id. at 261.
4. John Jay's Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of New York
(Apr. 12, 1790) (John Jay Papers, Columbia University).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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With only the ambiguity of the Constitution to guide them, the
American executive and legislature in the early years of the Re-
public made demands on the judiciary not entirely consistent with
a strict separation of powers. Most important, Congress imposed
on the Supreme Court Justices, in the Judiciary Act of 1789, the
duty to ride circuit as lower federal court judges. This assignment,
more than anything else, affected the behavior of the judges
throughout the first decade of the government's existence. Circuit
riding thrust the Justices into a nonjudicial role., Charged with ex-
plicating the laws and structure of the new government to grand
juries at circuit courts throughout the country, the Justices could
not help but think of themselves in political terms. The charge
that usually was given at the opening of each circuit court took
them outside the limits of a case or controversy, and the Justices
frequently took advantage of this opportunity to address issues of
the day. Once established as participants in the political life of the
nation, the Justices had to find some way of reconciling the inde-
pendence of the judiciary, a goal the Constitution clearly intended,
with the assignment by Congress and the executive of a great as-
sortment of extrajudicial tasks. Among these tasks was responding
to requests for advice from both of those branches, requests that
the Constitution arguably did not forbid.
The imposition of circuit duty in the very first legislation dealing
with the judiciary indicated Congress' tacit understanding that the
Justices of the Supreme Court sometimes could be dealt with as
individuals rather than in their institutional capacity as a Court.
In turn, the earliest Justices adopted immediately that same dis-
tinction when dealing with requests by the President and Congress
for advice on a variety of matters. As an institution, the Supreme
Court would adhere scrupulously to the separation of powers doc-
trine to insure that nothing would interfere with its constitutional
duty to be the final impartial arbiter in cases and controversies
properly presented to it. As individuals, however, the Justices
freely participated in a range of activities that might have compro-
mised their independence as an institution.
8. See Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, in 1967 Sup. CT. REv.
127.
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The earliest and most highly publicized episode in which the
Justices distinguished between their institutional role and their be-
havior as individuals occurred when they responded to the task ima-
posed upon them under the Invalid Pensions Act of 1792.9 It is
impossible to summarize adequately the events flowing from the
passage of that Act, especially because interpretations of those
events differ markedly. For our purposes today, however, the Act
required the circuit courts to certify the veracity of wounded Revo-
lutionary War veterans' claims to pensions and to recommend to
the Secretary of War whether an applicant should receive a pen-
sion and if so, in what amount.1" If the Secretary, upon reviewing a
court's recommendation, suspected no "imposition or mistake," he
was to add the invalid's name to the pension list of the United
States, but if he had any such suspicions, the Secretary could with-
hold the applicant's name from the list and report his action to
Congress."
During the first terms of the circuit courts following passage of
the Invalid Pensions Act of 1792, the judges refused to carry out
the duties assigned by that Act. The judges of the different circuits
all agreed that the duties imposed were not of a judicial nature
because the circuit courts' decisions pursuant to those duties could
be revised by the Secretary of War and eventually by Congress.
According to the judges, this sort of executive and legislative re-
view was inconsistent with the constitutionally mandated indepen-
dence of the judiciary; therefore, the circuit courts, as institutions,
could not perform the duties imposed by the Act.2 The judges
gave evidence of their conception of a dichotomy between the
court as an institution and judges as individuals, however, by de-
9. Invalid Pensions Act, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 243 (1792).
10. Id. § 2.
11. Id. § 4.
12. See Extract of the Minutes of the Circuit Court for the District of New York, April 5,
1791, in a Letter from John Jay, William Cushing, and James Duane to George Washington
(Apr. 10, 1792), printed in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, MISCELLANEOUS 49-50 (1834); Letter
from James Wilson, John Blair and Richard Peters to George Washington (Apr. 18, 1792),
printed in id. at 53; Letter from James Iredell and John Sitgreaves to George Washington
(June 8, 1792), printed in id.
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ciding to conduct the business assigned by the Act as commission-
ers out of court.13
Although the judges as individuals acquiesced in performing the
extrajudicial tasks assigned by the Invalid Pensions Act and by
many other acts during the first decade of the government's exis-
tence, they did not acquiesce because of a firmly enunciated policy
of carrying out these extrajudicial duties as individuals. Most of
their actions were ad hoc. Even in the invalid pensions case, the
judges responded not as a united judiciary, but as individual
judges on particular circuits.
The Justices maintained this institutional/individual division
when asked for an advisory opinion by the executive branch."4
Again, the Justices declared that, as an institution, the Court could
not advise the President on legal questions presented by the inter-
pretation of treaties of the United States and by the nation's in-
volvement in foreign affairs. Giving such opinions might compro-
mise the Justices' duty as a court of last resort, they told the
President.15 This did not stop them, however, from giving advice as
individuals to the President and to members and committees of
Congress when requested. That this advice might later come up in
a case presented to the Court did not seem to matter. Nor did this
concern seem important to either Chief Justice Jay or Chief Jus-
tice Ellsworth when he was appointed an envoy extraordinary to
negotiate a treaty with a foreign power. Although separation of
powers issues were raised during the Senate debates over confirma-
tion of these appointments, they were dismissed.16 In these partic-
13. See Extract of the Minutes of the Circuit Court for the District of New York, April 5,
1791, in a Letter from John Jay, William Cushing, and James Duane to George Washington
(Apr. 10, 1792), printed in 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) *410 n.(a).
14. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Chief Justice John Jay and Associate Justices (July
18, 1793) (John Jay Papers, Columbia University), quoted in Marcus & Van Tassel, supra
note 1, at 41 n.31.
15. Letter from John Jay, James Wilson, John Blair, James Iredell, and William Paterson
to George Washington (Aug. 8, 1793) (Record Group 59, National Archives), quoted in id. at
42.
16. Aaron Burr, for example, made the following motion during the debate on the Jay
nomination: "That to permit Judges of the Supreme Court to hold at the same time any
other office or employment emanating from and holden at the pleasure of the Executive is
contrary to the spirit of the Constitution and, as tending to expose them to the influence of
the Executive, is mischievous and impolitic." 1 JOURNAL OF THE EXECUTIVE PROCEEDINGS OF
THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 152 (1828) (Mr. Burr's Motion (Apr. 19,
1989]
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ular cases effective administration went by the wayside as well, for
the Supreme Court was left without a Chief Justice for prolonged
periods of time.
In a number of instances during the 1790s, congressional com-
mittees asked the Justices to submit bills that would improve the
Process Acts or the Judiciary Act, and the Justices cooperated.1"
Congressmen and Senators sent draft bills to the individual Jus-
tices for their comments, and they responded when possible. It
seems that the Justices showed little hesitation to involve them-
selves in political matters as long as it was understood that they
did so as individuals, and not as a Court.
The Justices also found the institutional/individual dichotomy
persuasive as they considered the more mundane question of how
the judicial branch should communicate with the other branches.
Here again, I echo Professor Casper, who noted the importance at-
tached to the methods of interaction between the executive and
legislative branches. 18 Undoubtedly, separation of powers consider-
ations played a significant role in the Justices' determination of
how they should approach Congress. I have no evidence of an ex-
plicit decision by the Supreme Court to route its institutional re-
quests for legislative change through the President, for him to lay
before Congress, but in every instance the Court did exactly that.
When, for example, the Court concluded that Congress required
official notice of the Justices' dislike of the circuit-riding system
and their desire for some relief from the burdensome duties it im-
posed on them, the Court routed its remonstrance through Presi-
dent Washington, explaining:
Your official connection with the Legislature and the considera-
tion that applications from us to them, cannot be made in any
manner so respectful to Government as through the President,
1794)). Jay's nomination as envoy extraordinary to Great Britain was confirmed on April 19,
1794. Id. The Senate agreed to Ellsworth's nomination as one of three ministers to France
on February 27, 1799. Id. at 318.
17. See, e.g., Letter from Congressman Samuel Sewall to William Cushing (Feb. 25, 1800)
(William Cushing Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society), quoted in Marcus & Van Tas-
sel, supra note 1, at 43; Letter from Representative Robert Goodloe Harper to William Pat-
erson (May 10, 1800) (William Paterson Papers, Rutgers University), quoted in id.
18. Casper, supra note 2, passim.
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induce us to request your attention to the enclosed representa-
tion and that you will be pleased to lay it before the Congress.19
Similarly, when an individual Justice in an institutional capacity
wished to make a formal representation to Congress, he did it
through the President. Justice James Iredell informed Congress in
this manner of a problem created by a Supreme Court interpreta-
tion of the congressional mandate for time limits for filing writs of
error if they were to operate as a supersedeas-a problem that
caused undue hardship to litigants. In his letter to President
Washington requesting Congress' attention in this matter, Iredell
noted that the Justices "were persuaded that if the mischief had
been foreseen [by Congress] as resulting from the law in question,
it would never have existed."2 He also specifically defended his
action in writing to the President:
[I]t is not only proper for a single Judge, but his express duty
when he deems it of importance to the public service, to state
any particular circumstances that occur to him in the course of
his personal experience which occasion unexpected difficulties or
inconveniences in the execution of a system so new and in many
respects unaided by any former examples. 21
Iredell's comments were communicated to Congress through the
Attorney General, and Congress amended the offending
22provision.
In all instances of making a formal institutional request to Con-
gress, the Justices made it through the President. When a single
Justice or judge wished to lobby Congress for legislative changes in
which he had a personal interest, however, he approached individ-
ual Congressmen directly. These actions were not seen as raising
separation of powers concerns. Much evidence points to a sus-
tained relationship between Justice James Iredell and his brother-
19. Letter from the Justices of the Supreme Court to George Washington (Aug. 9, 1792)
(Record Group 46, National Archives), quoted in Marcus & Van Tassel, supra note 1, at 49.
20. Letter from James Iredell to George Washington (Feb. 23, 1792), printed in 11 THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 47 (H. Syrett ed. 1966).
21. Id. at 46.
22. Letter of Tobias Lear to the Attorney General of the United States (Feb. 24, 1792)
(Record Group 59 M179, National Archives), noted in Marcus & Van Tassel, supra note 1,
at 45 n.45; Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 9, 1 Stat. 275-79 (1792).
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in-law Senator Samuel Johnston that resulted in a bill requiring
rotation of circuits among the Supreme Court Justices.13 United
States District Judge Henry Marchant maintained a steady corre-
spondence with various members of Congress in the hope of get-
ting an increase in his salary. 24 Other correspondence-between
Chief Justice Jay and Senator Rufus King, for example-suggests
that the practice of informal lobbying or contact between the judi-
cial and legislative branches certainly was not unusual during the
formative years of our constitutional system.2 5
In one instance, however, separation of powers considerations
did prevent the Justices from presenting Congress with a proposal
that was most important to them. The story is complicated, so I
offer merely a brief sketch. Because the Justices detested circuit
riding, in early 1792 they formulated a plan to suggest informally
to Congress that each Justice forfeit $500 of his salary in return for
being relieved of the duty to ride circuit.26 Chief Justice Jay, who
had misgivings about making such a proposal, wrote Justice Iredell
that "[t]o me it appears doubtful whether it would be recd. [by
Congress] with pleasure-If they should regard it as conveying an
Implication not flattering to their Ideas of their own Dignity, it
23. See, e.g., Letter from Samuel Johnston to James Iredell (Nov. 13, 1791), printed in 2
LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 335-36 (G. McRee ed. 1949); Letter from Sa-
muel Johnston to James Iredell (Nov. 26, 1794), printed in id. at 430-31; Act of April 13,
1792, ch. 21, 1 Stat. 252-53 (1792). Chief Justice Jay had made permanent assignments to
the Justices who lived in the particular circuits, thus forcing Iredell always to ride the
southern circuit, which was far more arduous an undertaking than riding the eastern or
middle circuits. See Letter from James Iredell to Justices Jay, Cushing and Wilson (Feb. 11,
1791), printed in id. at 322-25.
24. See, e.g., Letter from Henry Marchant to Theodore Foster (Nov. 12, 1791) (Theodore
Foster Papers, Rhode Island Historical Society), noted in Marcus & Van Tassel, supra note
1, at 46 n.48; Letter from Henry Marchant to Benjamin Bourne (Dec. 24, 1791) (Benjamin
Bourne Papers, Rhode Island Historical Society), noted in id.
25. See, e.g., Letter from John Jay to Rufus King (Dec. 22, 1793) (Rufus King Papers,
New York Historical Society), noted in id.
26. Letter from Thomas Johnson to James Iredell (Mar. 9, 1792) (Charles E. Johnson
Collection, North Carolina State Department of Archives and History), quoted in id. at 48;
Letter from James Iredell to Thomas Johnson (Mar. 15, 1792) (C. Burr Artz Public Library,
Frederick, Maryland), quoted in id.
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would produce disagreable Strictures."2  The plan was
abandoned.28
During the first decade of the government's existence, many
awkward moments in the congressional administration of the fed-
eral courts occurred.2 9 The Supreme Court Justices tried to make
things work as smoothly as possible. In doing this, they followed
Congress' lead by thinking of themselves and acting in two ways:
as an institution and as individuals. Although this division ap-
peared to work well in connection with the judiciary's relationship
to the other branches of government, the Justices deplored the ap-
plication of this dichotomy to their primary judicial task as a court
of last resort. As the Justices informed Congress when they wished
to put an end to their service as circuit judges:
The distinction made between the Supreme Court and its
Judges, and appointing the same men finally to correct in one
capacity, the errors which they themselves may have committed
in another, is a distinction unfriendly to impartial justice, and to
that confidence in the Supreme Court, which it is so essential to
the public Interest should be reposed in it.30
It took Congress almost one hundred years to respond to the Jus-
tices' complaint.3
27. Letter from John Jay to James Iredell (Mar. 19, 1792) (enclosed in letter from John
Jay to William Cushing (Mar. 19, 1792) (Robert Treat Paine Papers, Massachusetts Histori-
cal Society)), quoted in id.
28. See Letter from Thomas Johnson to James Iredell (Mar. 31, 1792) (Charles E. John-
son Collection, North Carolina State Department of Archives and History), quoted in id. at
49 n.59.
29. Examples of Congress' uneven administration of federal courts include the absence,
until 1794, of an adjournment act and an initial delay in the passage of the Crimes Act.
30. Letter from Justices of the Supreme Court to Congress (Aug. 9, 1792) (Record Group
46, National Archives), quoted in Marcus & Van Tassel, supra note 1, at 52.
31. On March 3, 1891, Congress passed the act that relieved Supreme Court Justices of
circuit duties. F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 97-101
(1928).
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